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Objectives: Although compensation for occupational injuries and diseases is guaranteed in almost all nations, countries vary 
greatly with respect to how they organize workers’ compensation systems. In this paper, we focus on three aspects of workers’ 
compensation insurance in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries - types of systems, em-
ployers’ funding mechanisms, and coverage for injured workers - and their impacts on the actual frequencies of occupational 
injuries and diseases.
Methods: We estimated a panel data fixed effect model with cross-country OECD and International Labor Organization data. We 
controlled for country fixed effects, relevant aggregate variables, and dummy variables representing the occupational accidents 
data source.
Results: First, the use of a private insurance system is found to lower the occupational accidents. Second, the use of risk-based 
pricing for the payment of employer raises the occupational injuries and diseases. Finally, the wider the coverage of injured work-
ers is, the less frequent the workplace accidents are. 
Conclusion: Private insurance system, fixed flat rate employers’ funding mechanism, and higher coverage of compensation 
scheme are significantly and positively correlated with lower level of occupational accidents compared with the public insurance 
system, risk-based funding system, and lower coverage of compensation scheme.
Key Words: Workers’ Compensation Insurance, Occupational injuries and diseases, Fixed effect model
Introduction
Occupational accidents not only threaten employees’ lives and 
damage employers’ human capital, but also increase the social 
costs of a country. In 1998, the global number of fatal injuries 
was estimated at 350,000, or 970 deaths per day. The number 
of  non-fatal occupational injuries with three or more days’ 
absence from work was also 264 million, which is more than 
700,000 injured workers per day [1]. In addition to the numbers 
of accidents, the cost of the accidents is also huge. The Interna-
tional Labor Organization (ILO) estimated that the total cost 
of occupational accidents and work-related diseases are 4% of 
the gross national product of a given country. 
To reduce these damages, almost all industrialized coun-
tries have introduced laws and regulations for the prevention 
of  occupational accidents and work-related diseases. Among 
others, some form of  government-mandated insurance guar-
antees compensation for injuries or diseases arising out of 
employment in virtually all nations (The US Social Security 
Administration has compiled a description of social insurance 
mechanisms in 112 countries. These descriptions are contained 
in a series of publications entitled Social Security Programmes 
Through out the World. Separate reports are published for four 
different regions of the world: Africa, the Americas, Asia and 
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the Pacific, and Europe). In reality, however, countries vary 
greatly with respect to how they organize workers’ compensa-
tion systems in terms of the sources of funds, the mechanisms 
used, and the allocation of  system costs among employers 
and others. Thus, it is easily predictable that these different 
approaches may have significant implications for system per-
formance, including employers’ and workers’ incentives to 
promote workplace safety and hence impact the actual the oc-
currence rates of occupational injuries and diseases.
In this study, we investigate the consequences of various 
terms of conditions in workers’ compensation insurance, e.g., 
types of systems used, employer’s payment mechanisms, and 
coverage of  compensation for the injured worker, on the oc-
currence of  occupational injury and disease. One distinctive 
feature of the study is that we address this issue in the context 
of  cross-country empirical analysis. Previously, many stud-
ies have performed similar research within a specific industry 
group(s) in a specific kind(s) of occupational injury. It is certain 
that those kinds of studies shed more light on the status of the 
small-scale picture of the relationship between workers’ com-
pensation insurance and occurrence of  occupational injuries 
and diseases. However, when policy-related issues are involved, 
comparisons and results with a rather widely designed setting 
is more appropriate since it can more directly reveal the under-
lying economic effects of a workers’ compensation insurance 
design.
One of  the critical issues in the cross-country empirical 
analysis is how to control the possible heterogeneity problems 
among the countries. Each country has a different definition in 
clarifying the fatal and non-fatal occupational injuries and dis-
eases, and each adopts different reporting systems in construct-
ing statistical databases. This means that the data may have 
serious measurement error problems and different degrees of 
under (over) estimation problems. Thus, it is important for the 
study to control the heterogeneity issues. In this study, we try 
to control these heterogeneities by using as many data sources 
as possible and identifying the data sources with various speci-
fication methods. A fixed effect model with panel data is also 
employed to control unobserved time invariant country specific 
fixed effects. 
After controlling for the various country fixed effects and 
several relevant aggregate variables, we found much important 
empirical evidence that the workers’ compensation system is 
significantly related with the occurrence of  occupational in-
juries and diseases. First, the regression result suggests that a 
private insurance system would be more efficient than a public 
(social) insurance system in that it lowers the occurrence of 
occupational injuries and diseases. The result implies that the 
efficiency and cost-reduction rationale for a private insurance 
system are stronger than the equity-based reasoning for public 
insurance for the reduction of occupational accidents. Second, 
risk-based pricing for the payment from an employer is corre-
lated with higher occupational injuries and diseases. This result 
seems to be surprising since it contradicts the conventional 
wisdom that a risk-based approach internalizes the hazards of 
occupational accidents, resulting in the reduction of the occur-
rence of  occupational injuries and diseases. Third, the result 
shows that the wider the coverage of injured workers is, the less 
frequent workplace accidents are. The result implies that the 
worker-comfort effect may surpass the moral hazard effects in 
the workplace. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next sec-
tion describes the backgrounds of the story of this paper. We 
describe several features and differences in workers’ compensa-
tion insurance and their potential effects on the frequency of 
occupational accidents. In Section 3, the econometric model, 
estimation methods are discussed. In Section 4, data used in 
this study is presented in terms of source and basic summary 
statistics. Section 5 and 6 summarize the empirical results and 
concludes the paper.
Materials and Methods
Workers’ compensation and occupational injuries
The analysis below investigates the factors affecting occupa-
tional injuries and diseases through cross-country regression 
analysis. We, in particular, focus on the relationship between 
the workers’ compensation system and the occurrence of occu-
pational injuries and diseases. The main purpose of the study is 
to examine how the workers’ compensation system, meaning 
aspects such as the types of systems, the payment mechanisms, 
and coverage of compensation, affect the occurrence of occu-
pational injuries and diseases.
Although compensation for injury or disease arising out 
of employment is guaranteed in virtually all nations, the degree 
of compensation varies greatly with respect to how each coun-
try operates and maintains workers’ compensation systems in 
terms of the sources of funds, the system used, the allocation 
of  system costs among employers and others, and the actual 
coverage for injured workers. These different approaches inevi-
tably generate significant implications for system performance, 
including employers’ and workers’ incentives to promote work-
place safety. 
One of the most debated issues in the design of workers’ 
compensation insurance is whether private insurers should be 
permitted to operate in the traditionally-held social (public) 
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insurance system [2]. Naturally the first aspect of the workers’ 
compensation insurance in Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (OECD) countries is the difference in 
the ‘types of systems’. We decompose the type of systems into 
two primary categories: social (public) insurance and private 
insurance (Although countries such as Thailand and Nigeria 
have ‘employer liability’ system, we exclude them since no 
OECD countries adopted this system).
Traditionally, proponents for government monopolies (so-
cial insurance) address the ‘market failure’ problem that could 
appear in workers’ compensation insurance. They argue that 
private companies may raise the workers’ compensation rates 
of  individual employers in the search for profits. The reason 
behind this is that private insurers would lead to ‘adverse selec-
tion,’ insuring only low-risk employers, and the national agency 
acting as society’s insurer of last resort will have more burden 
than ever. They also argue that public insurance may be neces-
sary to capture economies of scale that may exist in the insur-
ance industry (Besides the economic efficiency issue mentioned 
above, some proponents argue that workers’ compensation 
insurance should be developed as a ‘pure social insurance’ and 
a fundamental right or entitlement of citizenship. In this view, 
the unavoidable cross-subsidy in which the low-risk groups sub-
sidize the high-risk groups is judged to be good for the equity 
reason of  redistribution and could be achieved in the public 
insurance system).
On the other hand, proponents for a private insurance 
system argue that the entrance of insurance firms into the mar-
ket would induce efficiency and lower the costs of  any given 
level of  comparable insurance services. The argument is that 
the government monopoly, not being subject to the same com-
petitive pressures that the marketplace forces on private firms, 
would not provide the appropriate combination of  services 
and not administrate their system more efficiently than would 
a private insurer. This means that the public insurance system 
would not adopt more efficient cost-saving technologies, while 
the private sector would [2].
We believe that the two systems will have different effects 
on the incentives of  employers and workers. All other things 
being equal, the economic incentive for a private company to 
reduce the costs of any insurance services will affect the occur-
rence of occupational injuries and diseases (Some researchers, 
such as Klein and Krohm [3] see that the choice of public or 
private delivery mechanisms appears to be more a matter of a 
nation’s preference). Hence, although various rationales of pro-
ponents for both public and private insurance can be justified as 
possible explanations, we need an empirical investigation to see 
whether a particular system is helpful for the actual reduction 
of occurrences of occupational injuries and diseases.
The second aspect we focus on is the difference in the em-
ployers’ funding mechanisms. With respect to how employers 
are required to fund workers’ compensation costs, we distin-
guish fixed flat rates (tied to pay roll) from risk-based rates that 
vary among employers according to a system for assessing their 
relative risk level (In addition to the two categories, there are 
non-OECD countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nige-
ria where employers directly reimburse their workers’ compen-
sation costs [3]).
The economic incentives in the form of risk-based pric-
ing or graduated premiums strongly promote the effort of 
employers for the prevention of accidents and the avoidance of 
occupational injuries and diseases in the workplace. The key 
feature of  risk-based pricing is that employers with the same 
level of risk should pay the same cost according to the inherent 
hazards of a class of employment or the actual loss experience 
of an employer. This means that the employers hiring workers 
for the higher risk jobs will pay a higher insurance price than 
the employers hiring low-risk workers. The rationale for this 
approach is that the risk-based contribution or premium is not 
only equitable but it is also efficient in the sense that it internal-
izes their risk and the associated costs. It is often asserted that 
the risk-based pricing of insurance has strong theoretical appeal 
to economists and intuitive acceptance by risk managers and 
insurance professionals.
The third aspect is related to the difference in the compen-
sation coverage for injured workers. With respect to the cover-
age, two variables, the maximum period of absence day and the 
extent of income substitution, are considered as proxy variables 
representing the compensation coverage for injured workers. 
The absence day of the sample OECD countries varies from six 
months to unlimited periods, and the level of income substitu-
tion ranges from 50 percent to 100 percent. We categorize these 
variables using a 5-unit Likert Scale and examine the relation-
ship between the coverage of compensation and occurrence of 
occupational injuries and diseases. 
It is interesting to note that virtually all studies of claim 
usage in workers’ compensation insurance find that an increase 
in indemnity benefits increases claim frequency (Butler and 
Worrall [2] and references in the paper). For the reasons behind 
these results, Butler and Worrall [2] emphasized two different 
types of moral hazards. One is the ‘risk bearing’ moral hazard 
in which higher benefits induce workers to take more ex ante 
job risks given a higher level of  ex post injury compensation. 
The other is the ‘claims reporting’ moral hazard in which high-
er benefits have no effect on actual injuries (risk is unchanged) 
but does induce more claim filings. 
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While it is true that increasing coverage leads to more risk 
bearing and claims report of behaviors on the part of workers, 
we think there is another dimension to be considered. That is, 
the so-called ‘worker comforting’ effect in which higher benefits 
induce workers to have more secure and comfortable psycho-
logical status than before, and thus to work in a more safe way 
for given work related risks. We believe that these two different 
dimensions - moral hazard and worker comforting effects - 
should be checked empirically with cross-country data. 
The econometric model
This paper investigates how a worker’s compensation system 
affects the occurrence of  occupational injuries and diseases 
with a cross-country panel analysis. A key econometric issue 
is the heterogeneity among OECD countries. In practice, the 
problem of  not controlling for other sources of  variation in 
the frequency of occupational accidents is unlikely to be com-
pletely resolved by the inclusion of additional variables. This is 
because some sources actually affecting occupational accidents 
are not likely to be observable or available from any existing 
sources. We thus employ a fixed effect model with panel data 
to control for the time-invariant country-specific differences. 
The model properly captures the unobserved country differ-
ences being assumed fixed over time. The regression equation 
is as follows:
logYit = α + ∑βit logXit + θi + uit
Where uit = µi + εit,  εit ~ iid (0, σε). The error uit term con-
sists of the country fixed effect dummy µi, which is unobserv-
able to an econometrician, and the idiosyncratic error εit. The 
error term εit is assumed to have zero mean with finite variance. 
The subscript it represents country i in year t, which is com-
pressed hereafter for simplicity. Y is the occurrence of occupa-
tional injury and diseases of each country in each year, and X 
represents the vector of  variables affecting the occurrence of 
occupational injury and diseases. θ  indicates the workers’ com-
pensation system variables of country i.
Since data we are using in this study has features of cross-
country dimension, basic aggregate factors, such as income 
level, industrial structure, and others, will surely affect the oc-
currence of occupational injuries and diseases. Thus, in the set-
ting of international analysis like OECD countries in ours, it is 
important for the study to control common aggregate variables 
across countries that can affect the occurrence of occupational 
injuries and diseases. For these common aggregate variables, 
we choose four categories of  variables: income-related vari-
ables, industrial structure, population characteristics in labor 
markets, and other non-economic factors.
The first factor we need to control is the income level of 
each country. All other things being equal, income is certainly 
a variable that affects occupational injuries and diseases. Work-
ers tend to behave more cautiously in higher income countries 
since jobs and labor conditions in their workplaces are more 
properly matched with the individual characteristics of work-
ers. When the capabilities and interests of a worker are more 
efficiently allocated, there will be less possibility of occurrence 
of occupational injuries and diseases. Employers also enhance 
their investment in workplace safety and perform preventive ac-
tions against workplace accidents in higher income countries. 
Also, the higher labor costs, often observed in higher income 
countries, lead to more productive safety investment. We put 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita adjusted accommo-
dated with purchasing power parity in the regression equation 
to control for the various income levels of OECD countries.
Industrial structure is also an important factor since the 
occurrence of  occupational injuries and diseases varies to a 
large extent according to industrial sector. For example, manu-
facturing sectors generally have more accidents than service 
sectors [4]. It is also well known that, in terms of fatal injuries, 
the construction industry is one of the most hazardous indus-
tries in Europe as well as in many other countries around the 
world [2-6]. Thus the proportion of more hazardous industries 
is clearly an important factor determining the occurrence of 
occupational injuries and diseases in a cross-country study. We 
thus put the ratio of the manufacturing sector and the ratio of 
the construction industry over the total value added of  each 
country in the regression equation.
Many literature documents report that population charac-
teristics and gender difference could also be important factors 
determining the occurrence of  occupational accidents since 
the workers ranged in 25-54 years old and male workers tend 
to take more risks than female or old (or younger) workers. For 
example, Gupta et al. [7] showed, using experimental data, 
that given a choice between the riskier options of a tournament 
and a less risky option of payment by piece rates, men choose 
a tournament significantly more often than do women. Reed 
and Dahlguist [8] also find empirical evidence that in the US 
women are more likely to be employed in safer jobs than men. 
Grazier and Sloane [9] also find that women are more risk 
averse than men in both the UK and US with family data. We 
thus put the proportion of female workers over all workers in 
an economy in the regression equation.
With similar reasoning, the ratio of the virtual workforce 
is considered as an important factor determining occupational 
accidents. In general, the workers whose age is in the range of 
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25-54 years old, which is called the ‘virtual workforce group’, 
are most active in their economic activities and the likelihood 
of risk tolerance seems to be higher than others. Thus, all other 
things being equal, we expect that the ratio of the virtual work-
force is positively correlated with occupational injuries and 
diseases.
Non-economic factors, such as healthcare expenditure 
and education status, also have important implications for 
workplace accidents. Generally, we can predict that countries 
with more healthcare investment and higher educated workers 
will experience fewer workplace accidents.
As mentioned above, the main goal of  the study is to 
investigate the relationship between the workers’ compensa-
tion system and the occurrence of  occupational injuries and 
diseases. Based upon the aggregate variables to control the 
cross-country heterogeneity, the variables, such as type of sys-
tem (private vs. public insurance systems), employers’ funding 
mechanisms (fixed flat rate vs. risk based contribution rate), 
and coverage for injured workers (maximum absence day, in-
come substitution), are augmented in order to identify the effect 
of the compensation system on the occurrence of occupational 
accidents. The variables indicating the type of  system and 
funding mechanisms are employed as dummy variables, and 
coverage variables are categorized with 5 unit Likert scales (See 
below more details). 
Meanwhile, we need to consider the country difference 
in the data-collecting process with respect to occupational 
injuries and diseases. Some countries obtain data from their 
occupational accident reporting systems, while others collect 
data through their occupational injury insurance compensation 
schemes. The previous research suggests that claim data from 
occupational injury compensation schemes may have a strong 
tendency to contain the moral hazard behavior. Thus we need 
to control the difference in data collection process for the em-
pirical analysis. 
Table 1 shows the country lists according to the particular 
data collection process for occupational injuries and diseases. 
Table 1, for example, shows that the United States and Japan 
collect occupational accident data through an injury reporting 
system (e.g., to a labor inspectorate), while Korea, Germany, 
and Austria rely on the occupational injury insurance compen-
sation schemes. We control the data source differences with a 
dummy variable in the regression equation.
Data and summary statistics
The analysis below investigates the effect of the insurance sys-
tems on the occurrence of occupational injuries and diseases. 
The main goal of the paper is to analyze how the three aspects 
of  workers’ compensation insurance - types of  systems, em-
ployers’ funding mechanisms, and coverage for injured workers 
affect the actual frequency of  occupational injuries and dis-
eases. For this purposes, we adopt cross-country studies using 
various country level data with a 1990-2008 sample period.
The data used in the analysis are collected from the vari-
ous resources. The occurrence of  occupational injuries and 
diseases is constructed using the ILO LABORSTA data base, 
and other aggregate level country data are used from World 
Development Indicators and OECD STAN database. The 
number of  fatal injury and diseases is mainly obtained from 
the ILO LABORSTA data base. The concerns of the empirical 
analysis are how to treat the missing observations and control 
the data set reported under different measurement unit across 
countries. For the treatment of missing values, we filled in the 
average of previous (t - 1) and after (t + 1) year value of missing 
observations. Because the reported number of fatal injury and 
diseases of each country has different measurement standard, it 
is necessary for us to unify the reported unit for the consistency 
of empirical analysis. Following the major reporting standard 
that the most country have used, we employed the ‘per 100,000 
people occurrence’ unit and converted the number of  injury 
and diseases of each country according to the associated mea-
surement standard. Table 2 reports the variable definitions and 
data sources used in the regression analysis. The sample used 
in the study covers the 23 OECD countries over a 19 year time 
period (1990-2008).
The basic summary statistics show that the average GDP 
per capita of  sample OECD countries is 27,590 dollars and 
on average fatal occupational injuries and diseases occur 5.32 
times per year, while non-fatal occupational accidents take 
place 2,990 times per year. OECD countries turn out to spend 
Table 1. Data source of occupational injuries
Insurance/Compensation Report 
Country Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Korea, Portugal, Switzerland, Western Germany, Australia
Denmark, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, 
United States, Czech Republic, Spain, Hungary
Data Source: LABORSTA, International Labor Organization.
An Empirical Study with OECD Cross-Country Panel Data
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8.46% of  their GDP on health care and 26% of  workforce 
graduated from an occupational college or above. Among 
the sample countries, 36% of countries adopted private insur-
ance systems for occupational injuries and diseases, and 64% 
of countries took employers’ risk based funding mechanisms. 
With respect to the coverage of  compensation, the average 
absence day period was 1.5-2 years, and the compensation was 
78% of usual income, on average. The standard deviations of 
each variable are large enough to suggest that there are wide 
variations in the macro-economic environments and compen-
sation systems, which we need to control for in a proper way. 
Now we are turning to the regression results.
Results
Tables 3 and 4 show regression results. To control for the pos-
sible unobserved country heterogeneity, we use a fixed effect 
model with panel data. The multi-collinearity problem among 
explanatory variables is tested and resolved through a two-stage 
residual regression method. The impact of  each determinant 
could be different to the extent that the characteristics of each 
occupational accident differ. We separately run the regression 
analysis for fatal and non-fatal occupational accidents, and 
compare whether the factors affecting on the accidents show 
qualitatively different estimation results. 
The first column of Table 3 reports the estimation results 
using nine basic explanatory variables. The estimation results 
are generally consistent with the theoretical expectations and 
show similar regression results under various specifications. 
The regression results show that the occurrence of  occupa-
tional injuries and diseases decreases as the individual income 
of a country increases and unemployment is positively corre-
lated with the occupational injuries. If  an economy consists of 
a large portion of manufacturing sector or construction sector, 
the occupational injuries and diseases occurred more frequent-
ly. These empirical results are consistent with the traditional 
view that occupational accidents are highly correlated with 
income level, the portion of  risky industries, and the macro-
Table 2. Variable definitions and summary statistics
Variables Definition Mean (SD) Data source
Fatal The number of fatal injury and diseases      5.32 (6.26) ILO
Non-Fatal The number of non-fatal injury and diseases 2,990.8 (2,665.9) ILO
GDPK GDP per capita, accommodated with PPP  27,590 (6,401) WDI
Unemployment The ratio of unemployment      7.21 (3.55) OECD STAN DB
Manufacturing ratio The manufacturing ratio over total value added      0.19 (0.04) OECD STAN DB
Construction ratio The construction ratio over total value added      0.06 (0.02) OECD STAN DB
Men2554 ratio The ratio of virtual workforce ratio      0.56 (0.03) OECD STAN DB
Women Women employment ratio      0.44 (0.36) OECD STAN DB
Education The ratio of workers who graduated from occupational college 
and above
     0.26 (0.09) WDI
Health The ratio of health expenditure over GDP      8.46 (1.89) OECD STAN DB
Data source dummy Report = 0, Compensation = 1      0.57 (0.50) ILO
Type of systems Public = 0, Private = 1      0.36 (0.48) Park [10]
Employers’ fundinging mechanisms Fixed Flat rates = 0, Contribution = 1      0.64 (0.48) Park [10]
Absence days Permitted absence days for occupational injuries and diseases      3.26 (1.48) Park [10]
Income substitution The degree of income substitution      3.20 (1.23) Park [10]
SD: standard deviation, ILO: International Labor Organization, WDI: world development indicators, OECD: Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development, GDP: gross domestic product, PPP: purchasing power parity, DB: database.
Variables ‘Fatal’, ‘Non-Fatal’, ‘GDPK’ are transformed into logarithmic values when we run the regressions. 
Absence day and Income substitution are categorized using a 5 unit Likert-Scale and are assigned as follows: Absence day: 6 month = 1, 1 
year = 2, 1 year and 6 month = 3, 2 years = 4, unlimited = 5.
Income substitution: 50-59% = 1, 60-69% = 2, 70-79% = 3, 80-89% = 4, 90-100% = 5. 
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economic environments, such as unemployment or business 
cycles.
Another important regression result that we need to take 
note of is the large and significant statistical effect of the con-
struction industry on the fatal accidents. The regression results 
show the estimates range from 13.55 to 15.23 and are statisti-
cally significant at a 1% significance level under various specifi-
cations. This implies that a 1% increase in the construction in-
dustry ratio tends to increase the occurrence of fatal accidents 
by 13-15%. Comparing with the estimates of non-fatal injuries, 
whose coefficients are 2.95-4.29, the effect of the construction 
industry on fatal accidents is 5 times larger than that on non-
fatal accident cases. This result implies that the safety of  the 
construction industry is one of  the critical factors to control 
fatal injuries and diseases.
The statistical analysis also suggests that population 
structure and gender difference are also important factors for 
explaining occupational accidents. The virtual workforce ra-
tio (men 2,554) is positively and significantly associated with 
a high occurrence rate of  occupational injuries and diseases. 
Holding other factors constant, a 1% increase in the virtual 
workforce ratio tends to increase the occurrence of fatal acci-
dents by 7.8%, on average. Even though the magnitude of the 
estimated coefficient is relatively small, the women employ-
ment ratio shows a statistical significance with a 5 percent sig-
nificance level and this turns out to decrease the occurrence of 
fatal injuries. 
The relative attribution of  virtual workforce on occupa-
tional accidents is much higher in non-fatal injury cases. A 1% 
increase in virtual workforce increases the rate of occupational 
injuries by 13-14% for non-fatal injuries and diseases, and 
7.8% for fatal injury cases. The women employment ratio is 
also positively correlated with non-fatal accident rates while 
it is negatively associated with fatal accidents. The population 
structure and gender difference are more attributable to non-
fatal occupational accidents than to fatal accident cases.
As mentioned above, the central goal of  the study is to 
analyze how the three aspects of workers’ compensation insur-
ance systems, the type of system, employers’ funding mecha-
nisms, and coverage for injured workers, affect on the actual 
frequency of occupational injuries and diseases. We create set 
of dummy variables with binomial or 5 unit likert scale choices 
and examine whether those category variables present statisti-
cal significance based upon the theoretical prediction. The re-
Table 3. Regression results: fatal injuries and diseases
Fatal Injury Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5)
GDP per capita -0.827* (0.175) -0.827* (0.175) -0.827* (0.175) -0.973* (0.183) -0.549† (0.241)
Unemployment 0.038* (0.007) 0.038* (0.007) 0.038* (0.007) 0.044* (0.007) 0.049* (0.008)
Manufacturing ratio 1.876† (0.897) 1.876† (0.897) 1.876† (0.897) 2.256† (0.950) 5.100* (1.158)
Construction ratio 13.552* (1.804) 13.552* (1.804) 13.552* (1.804) 14.198* (1.862) 15.232* (1.982)
Men2554 ratio 7.873* (2.658) 7.873* (2.658) 7.873* (2.658) 6.481† (2.721) 1.723 (3.040)
Women employment ratio -0.064† (0.032) -0.064† (0.032) -0.064† (0.032) -0.072† (0.033) -0.106* (0.037)
Education 0.033* (0.004) 0.001 (0.003) -0.064* (0.004) -0.017† (0.007) 0.032* (0.005)
Health -0.167* (0.026) -0.167* (0.026) -0.167* (0.026) -0.206* (0.029) -0.158* (0.030)
Data source dummy -0.995* (0.120) -1.431* (0.162) -1.084* (0.209) 0.003 (0.135) 0.917* (0.131)
Type of systems -0.741* (0.088)
Employers’ funding mechanisms 0.985* (0.150)
Absence days -0.079* (0.015)
Income substitution -0.605* (0.040)
No. of observation 323 323 290 213
R-squared 0.949 0.949 0.952 0.948
GDP: gross domestic product.
Country fixed effects are not reported in the Table.
*, †Indicates the statistical significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
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gression results show that the three factors play significant roles 
in determining the rates of occupational injuries and diseases.
One of the most controversial issues with respect to the 
type of  systems is whether a private insurance system would 
induce efficiency, thus lowering the occurrence of  any given 
level of occupational accidents. The actual types of insurance 
systems among various OECD countries are summarized in 
Table 5. 
The regression results show that it does. The estimated 
coefficient of the ‘type of systems’ is -0.741 and shows statisti-
cal significance with a 1% level. The result imply that, all other 
things being equal, the permission of private insurance system 
entrance into the market decreases the occurrence of fatal ac-
cident by 0.74%, which means a private insurance system is 
more efficient than a public insurance system in the sense that 
it decreases the occurrence of occupational accidents.
Employers’ funding mechanisms, however, turns out to 
have a positive correlation with fatal injuries. That is, the em-
ployers’ risk based insurance system is correlated with higher 
rates of fatal accidents than the fixed, flat rate funding mecha-
nisms. The estimated coefficient is 0.985 with a 1% statistical 
significance. This means that, all other things being equal, the 
change of  the funding mechanism from fixed-flat rate into a 
risk-based insurance system causes a 0.985% increase in fatal 
injuries and diseases. The result is somewhat surprising because 
the theoretical literature predicts that employers will internal-
ize the cost of occupational risk under the risk based funding 
mechanism and promote efforts for accident prevention.
Table 4. Regression results: non-fatal injuries and diseases
Non-fatal injury Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5)
GDP per capita -1.056* (0.187) -1.056* (0.187) -1.056* (0.187) -0.955* (0.198) -1.266* (0.302)
Unemployment -0.005 (0.007) -0.005 (0.007) -0.005 (0.007) -0.009 (0.007) -0.014 (0.010)
Manufacturing ratio 2.238† (0.990) 2.238† (0.990) 2.238† (0.990) 3.191* (1.063) 3.517† (1.521)
Construction ratio 4.287† (1.959) 4.287† (1.959) 4.287† (1.959) 3.056 (2.045) 2.951 (2.561)
Men2554 ratio 13.617* (2.576) 13.617† (2.576) 13.617* (2.576) 13.364* (2.690) 14.455* (3.383)
Women employment ratio 0.087* (0.031) 0.087* (0.031) 0.087* (0.031) 0.100* (0.033) 0.100† (0.041)
Education 0.053* (0.005) -0.015* (0.003) -0.069* (0.004) -0.049* (0.007) 0.053* (0.007)
Health -0.165* (0.026) -0.165* (0.026) -0.165* (0.026) -0.168* (0.029) -0.137* (0.035)
Data source dummy -1.298* (0.127) 1.153* (0.135) -0.731* (0.164) 0.858* (0.144) 1.400* (0.165)
Type of systems -0.860* (0.096)
Employers’ funding mechanisms 1.030* (0.155)
Absence days -0.046* (0.017)
Income substitution -0.837* (0.046)
No. of observation 355 355 355 322 245
R-squared 0.959 0.959 0.959 0.957 0.956
GDP: gross domestic product.
Country fixed effects are not reported in the Table.
*, †Indicates the statistical significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Table 5. OECD countries and the type of insurance systems
Type of systems Public Private
Countries Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
Portugal, Switzerland, United States
OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
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The degree of compensation is negatively and significant-
ly correlated with occupational injuries as it is expected. With 
longer absence days and higher levels of income substitution, 
the occurrence of occupational accidents is decreased. This re-
sult implies that the ‘worker comfort effect’ is stronger than any 
‘moral hazard’ effect.
The regression results of  non-fatal injuries and diseases 
show qualitatively similar results to the results of fatal injuries 
and diseases. Type of system and the degree of compensation 
are negatively correlated with rates of occupational injuries and 
diseases, while the risk based insurance system is correlated 
with higher rates of accidents in both cases. 
The empirical results that we need to notice are the rela-
tive contribution of the construction industry, population struc-
ture, and gender difference on the rates of  occupational acci-
dent and diseases. For fatal accidents, the construction industry 
is one of  the most important factors for explaining the acci-
dents, while the population structure is important for explain-
ing the accidents for non-fatal accidents. It is also an interesting 
feature that the gender difference affects, in an opposite way, 
the occurrence of occupational accidents. The regression result 
shows that fatal accidents decrease as the women employment 
ratio increases, while non-fatal accidents increase. We believe 
that this result is due to the fact that woman workers are, in 
general, not involved in risky jobs or workplaces.
Discussion
This paper has examined the factors affecting the occurrence of 
occupational injuries and diseases. We, in particular, investigate 
how various workers’ compensation insurance system compo-
nents, such as the type of system, employers’ funding mecha-
nism, and coverage of compensation for injured workers affect 
the occurrence of occupational injuries and diseases. 
Controlling for heterogeneity and multi-collinearity 
problems with a cross-country fixed effect model, the regres-
sion results provide empirical evidence that the compensation 
system plays an important role in explaining the occurrence of 
occupational injuries and diseases among OECD countries. 
A private insurance system, fixed flat rate employers’ fund-
ing mechanism, and higher compensation coverage scheme 
are significantly and positively correlated with lower levels 
of  occupational accidents compared to the public insurance 
system, risk-based funding system, and lower compensation 
coverage scheme. These results indicate that employers under 
private insurance systems promote their efforts more to reduce 
occupational accidents and the associated insurance costs by 
internalizing the risk of the work place. Higher coverage is also 
associated with lower occurrence of occupational injuries and 
diseases, which indicates that the ‘worker comfort effect’ is 
greater than the ‘moral hazard effect.’ These results mean that 
the insurance compensation system plays an important role in 
determining the occurrence of  occupational injuries and dis-
eases and the policy makers need to consider the effect of the 
insurance systems in order to reduce the occurrence of occupa-
tional accidents. 
Another important finding is that the factors representing 
industry structure (such as the ratio of  construction industry 
and the ratio of manufacturing sector over the economy) have 
stronger effects on the occurrence of fatal accidents, while the 
population structure or gender difference is more attributable to 
the occurrence of non-fatal accidents. These empirical results 
suggest that the policy makers need to be aware of the relative 
effectiveness of  policy instruments and set policy priorities 
when they focus on a specific type of occupational accident. 
As mentioned above, the critical econometric issue of the 
cross-country study is how to control the possible heterogene-
ity problem among the countries. In this study, we use as much 
data as possible to identify the heterogeneities as well as panel 
data fixed effects models to control them. The cross-country 
differences in the source of  gathered data on occupational 
injuries and diseases could also be identified with the ILO LA-
BORSTA database. However, we need to mention that, if  un-
observed characteristics of countries change over time in ways 
that affect occupational accidents differentially, these effects 
are not captured by the fixed effects model, and the relation-
ship between workers’ compensation insurance terms and ac-
cidents frequency may not be correctly identified. Even though 
it is reasonable for us to assume that several data differences - 
definitions of occupational accidents, lack of data, and under-
estimation practices - may have constant effects within a coun-
try for the given time periods (1990-2008), we need to check the 
validity of the assumption. A more detailed treatment of these 
issues awaits further work.
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